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Abstract. We measured the beliefs and behavior of third parties who were given the
opportunity to add to or deduct from the payoffs of individuals who engaged in an
economic bargaining game under different social contexts. Third parties rewarded
bargaining outcomes that were equal and compensated victims of unfair bargaining
outcomes rather than punishing perpetrators, but were willing to punish when
compensation was not an available option. Beliefs of whether unequal bargaining
outcomes were fair differed based on the normative context, but actual punishment,
compensation, and rewarding behavior did not. This paper makes a contribution to
the literature on informal mechanisms of social norm enforcement by comparing
negative sanctions, positive sanctions, and compensation behavior by third parties.
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1. Introduction
Without legal enforcement, social norms rely on informal sanctions to produce
norm-conforming behavior. Empirical studies have reported evidence of negative
sanctions (e.g., punishment) both by parties directly involved in the norm-governed
interaction (de Quervain, et al., 2004), and by uninvolved third parties (Kahneman,
Knetsch, & Thaler, 1986; Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004; Kurzban, DeScioli, & O’Brien,
2007). In these studies, the punished transgression refers to a violation of social
norms of fairness or reciprocity, but usually no independent evidence is presented
about the players’ consensus about the norm’s existence and relevance to the
experimental situation. In the definition that we adopt, a social norm (Bicchieri 2006,
p.11) is a behavioral rule for which it must hold for sufficiently many people that: 1.
they know that such an approved behavioral rule exists; 2. they prefer to comply
with the rule if they believe a) that others will also comply (empirical expectations)
and b) that others believe they ought to comply and might sanction non-compliance
(normative expectations). We explore the possibility that individuals may employ
compensation and rewards – in addition to sanctions – as mechanisms for upholding
social norms.
Notice this definition allows a social norm to exist while not always being
followed. Only if sufficiently many people have the appropriate empirical and
normative expectations about others’ behavior and beliefs will a social norm reliably
be followed. Consensus and compliance may thus differ. While observed behavior
remains a crucial measure of compliance with elicited norms, recent experimental
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work has introduced the explicit use of questionnaires to assess normative consensus
(Bicchieri & Chavez, 2010; Bicchieri, Xiao, & Muldoon, 2011; Krupka & Weber,
2013; Rauhut &Winter, 2010; Reuben & Riedl, 2013). In this paper, we therefore
measure both the beliefs and behavior of third parties who tradeoff sanctioning,
compensating, and rewarding in response to the violation of or compliance with a
social norm.
An example of informal sanctioning is the punishment of individuals who
divide a good unfairly, when the understanding of what constitutes fair division
depends on context. Under an equality context, a fair division is one in which goods
are allocated equally amongst all parties. Under an equity context, a fair division is
one that divides goods according to each party’s share due to merit or acquired right.
Assessing normative consensus should show different judgments of what counts as
fair in equity versus equality conditions and this differential assessment should be
reflected in behavior. So we would expect third-party punishment levels to differ
under contexts that invoke rules either of equity or equality. In particular, we would
expect uneven divisions to be punished less under equity contexts in which one party
is perceived as being entitled to a greater share of the good.
Although costly punishment is more commonly studied, it is not the sole
mechanism for upholding a social norm. Costly rewarding also plays a role in
supporting pro-social behavior. When both punishments and rewards were available
to the players, second-party rewarding was frequent and promoted cooperation
(Rand, Dreber, Ellingsen, Fudenberg, & Nowak, 2009; Andreoni, Harbaugh, &
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Vesterlund, 2003). Third-party rewarding was also common when there was the
possibility of reputation formation (Milinski, Semmann, & Krambeck, 2002; Seinen
& Shram, 2006). Few experimental studies, however, have compared third party
punishment and rewarding in a non-repeated, reputation free game (cf. Almenberg,
Dreber, Apicella, & Rand, 2011). Whereas positive and negative sanctions promote
norms in that they increase their long-term expected realization, another mechanism
for upholding social norms is compensation of the victim of a violation.
Compensation is not directly norm promoting. It rather honors norms, as it points to
the fact that the victim ought to have received a fair share or had a right to be treated
fairly. If indeed compensation has such an important signaling function, we would
expect all three regulatory mechanisms – compensation, punishment, and rewarding
– to be employed in upholding social norms.
Our hypothesis is thus that third parties will employ both compensation and
positive sanctions in addition to negative sanctions when all three regulatory
mechanisms are available. Furthermore, it is worthwhile to investigate whether the
presence of all three mechanisms leads individuals to discount one in favor of
another. For example, the opportunity to compensate victims might focus third
parties on feelings of compassion, which has been found to decrease punitive
sentiment (Condon & DeSteno, 2011).
To test our hypothesis, we focused on a version of the Ultimatum Game
(Guth, Schmittberger, & Schwarze, 1982) in which Proposers proposed a division of
a sum of $10 to Responders, who accepted or rejected the offer. In the case of a
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rejection, both parties received nothing. Previous studies found that both Proposer
behavior and second-party punishment were sensitive to different fairness contexts.
When the roles of Proposer and Responder were assigned randomly, Proposers
offered an average of 45% of the sum (for a review, see Camerer, 2003, Chapter 2).
But when the role of Proposer was earned by higher scorers on a general knowledge
quiz, Proposers offered an average of only 35%. Moreover, overall rejection rates
were the same whether roles were assigned randomly or based on quiz performance
(Hoffman, McCabe, Keith, & Smith, 1994), although Proposers offered moderately
less in the latter condition, apparently feeling entitled to a larger share under an
equity context. Similarly, Falk, Fehr, and Fischbacher (2003) created different offer
contexts by allowing the Proposer to 1) choose between offering 20% and 50%, and
2) choose between offering 20% and 0%. They found that in the first context,
Proposers offered 20% only 31% of the time, but in the second context they always
offered 20%. Moreover, in the first context, Responders who were offered 20%
rejected the offer 44% of the time, whereas in the second context, Responders who
were offered 20% rejected only 9% of the time. In the first context, the presence of a
50/50 option prompts a norm of fairness, whereas in the second case an offer of 20%
may just be perceived as generous (see Bicchieri, 2006, Chapter 3). Thus, secondparty punishment is clearly sensitive to context, and whether a given context elicits a
specific norm.
Is third-party punishment, compensation, or rewarding behavior sensitive to
fairness context? To answer this question, we conducted a two-stage study in which
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participants engaged in an Ultimatum Game under an equity or equality context in
Stage 1, and in Stage 2, third parties decided to add to or deduct from the payoffs of
participants from Stage 1 based on their bargaining outcome. To determine whether
third parties were willing to trade off compensation and punishment, we created a
separate experimental condition in which third parties only had the option of
deducting from the payoffs of Stage 1 participants. This design allowed us to assess
whether third parties preferred to compensate victims or punish perpetrators of unfair
bargaining outcomes, and to assess whether third parties would reward fair
bargaining outcomes. We discuss data only from Stage 2 below.
2. Materials and Methods
2.1. Participants
198 college-age participants took part in Stage 2 of our study, for which
advertisements specified that participants would earn $5.00 in addition to an amount
that would depend on decisions made during the experiment. Of these 198
participants, we excluded 2 due to data entry problems, leaving a total sample size of
196.
2.2. Procedure
In Stage 1, participants were asked to read an article and were then given a written
quiz on the contents of the article. They then played a single Ultimatum Game, in
which a Proposer was randomly and anonymously paired with a Responder, and
offered a division of $10 in increments of $1 to the Responder. That is, the Proposer
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could choose an offer of $10 for the Proposer and $0 for the Responder, $9 for the
Proposer and $1 for the Responder, $8 for the Proposer and $2 for the Responder,
etc., so that the two amounts summed to $10 – hereafter, these divisions are denoted
($10,$0), ($9,$1), ($8,$2), and so on, where the first amount is the Proposer’s payoff
and the second amount is the Responder’s payoff. The Responder then chose to
accept or reject the offer; in the case of an acceptance, the Proposer and Responder
got the amounts specified by the offer, but in the case of a rejection, both parties got
nothing. In the equity condition, the roles of Proposer and Responder were assigned
based on quiz performance, where the instructions emphasized the entitlement of the
Proposer: “[T]hose of you who scored in the top half on the quiz have earned the
right to be a Proposer,” adapting the procedure of Hoffman et al. (1994). In the
equality condition, roles were assigned randomly. Participants were told that their
final payments might be adjusted up or down based on decisions made in other
experiments.
In Stage 2, participants read a detailed description of the Stage 1 task
described above, including the instructions that Stage 1 participants received in
either the equity condition or the equality condition. Participants in Stage 2 were
then given an opportunity to adjust the payoffs of one pair of participants from Stage
1 whose photocopied bargaining sheet they saw. The only bargaining outcomes we
used were ones in which the Proposer offered ($5,$5), ($7,$3), or ($8,$2), and the
Responder accepted. Approximately one week after Stage 1 was completed, an
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experimenter paid the participants whose bargaining sheets were used in Stage 2,
based on the third parties’ average adjustments.
In the all-adjustments condition, participants were given $2.50 that they
could use at a ratio of 1:4 to add to or deduct from the actual payoff of a Proposer
from Stage 1, and another $2.50 that they could use at a ratio of 1:4 to add to or
deduct from the payoff the Responder who was paired with the Proposer. For the
uneven bargaining outcomes of ($7,$3) and ($8,$2), this condition allowed
participants to punish Proposers and/or compensate Responders in various degrees
and in any combination. For the even bargaining outcome of ($5,$5), it allowed
participants to reward Proposers or exhibit the unlikely spiteful behavior of
deducting from the payoff of either Proposers or Responders. The deduct-only
condition was the same as the all-adjustments condition, except that participants
could adjust the Proposer’s and Responder’s payoffs only by deducting from them,
which forced participants to punish Proposers if they wished to enact any sanctions.
Participants were informed that they would have to announce their decision to the
room full of other third parties at the end of the experiment, and that their decisions
were therefore not anonymous. Though the lack of anonymity could create
incentives to perform in front of others (third parties and experimenters), we
introduced it to make salient the normative expectations associated with norm
violation and compliance. For example, if punishment of norm transgressors is
socially expected, we would expect a sizable number of third parties to punish unfair
Proposers or possibly reward fair ones. If compensation is another mechanism by
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which individuals uphold social norms, we would also expect to observe
compensating behavior. The public announcement should therefore lend particular
salience to those mechanisms that drive norm compliance, and possibly uncover a
collective preference for some mechanisms over others.
Finally, at the end of the study, Stage 2 participants were given a
questionnaire. The first question read, “Do you believe the following proposal is fair
for both the Proposer and the Responder?” and then listed the 11 possible divisions
of the $10.00 sum. These questions elicit players’ personal normative beliefs
regarding fair divisions in the equity versus equality conditions described in the
Stage 1 game. The second question measured second-order normative beliefs
(normative expectations) in an incentivized manner:
“The questions below refer to the first page of this survey, which all
participants in this experiment are answering. After we collect all
participants’ forms, we will randomly select three questions from this page,
for which you will earn a $1.00 bonus each, if you guessed correctly. Now
for each line below, please guess whether the majority of the participants in
this room thought that that particular proposal was fair. Circle your answers,”
The questionnaire then listed the 11 possible divisions again.
The binary responses to these 22 variables comprised the belief data, which
were designed to measure third parties’ respective first- and second-order normative
beliefs about the fairness of each offer. Asking about first-order normative beliefs
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does not let us conclude that a social norm is in place, and is perceived as such by
the participants. We may all think that a 50/50 division is fair, but this does not
necessarily imply that we also think most others hold the same conviction. For a
social norm to exist (Bicchieri, 2006, p. 11), there must be collective consensus that
a specific behavioral rule is socially prescribed (or proscribed) in a given context. In
this case, second-order normative beliefs (normative expectations) about what is fair
will be mutually consistent. For example, individuals could believe that ($7,$3) is
fair (first-order normative belief), but not expect others to believe it (second-order
normative belief), in which case there would be no mutually shared belief that
($7,$3) is socially prescribed.1 Without agreement in second-order normative beliefs
(normative expectations), a behavioral regularity would not be a social norm, and
consequently there would be no agreement about what behaviors constitute a norm
violation and therefore might elicit a sanction, as well as a compensation for the
victim.
2.3. Design
This led to a 2 x 3 x 2 between-participants design of adjustment condition (deductonly or punish/compensate/reward), offer (($5,$5), ($7,$3), or ($8,$2)), and fairness
context (equity or equality). The dependent variable was the pair of adjustments in
USD that the third party made to the Proposer’s and Responder’s payoffs. We
predicted that the amounts paid to punish the Proposer and compensate the
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A typical case in which first and second-order normative beliefs diverge is that of pluralistic
ignorance, where a majority of group members privately reject a norm, but assume incorrectly that
most others accept it and thus keep obeying it (Katz & Allport, 1931)
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Responder would decrease with increases in the amount that the Proposer offered to
the Responder, as third parties would find fewer reasons to adjust payoffs for
divisions which were closer to equality. However, we expected the effect of offer
would be moderated by fairness context, as uneven offers would be interpreted as
being fairer under an equity context. As a separate hypothesis, we predicted that
participants would trade off punishment and compensation in the all-adjustments
condition, so that the amounts they deducted from the Proposer’s payoff would be
lower than in the deduct-only condition. Whenever presented with even offers of
($5,$5) in the all-adjustments condition, we also expected third parties to offer some
reward to Proposers for obeying a fairness norm, the reward being possibly greater
in a condition of equity, where some deviation from a 50/50 share is justifiable.
Because we expected little to no variation in the behavior of third parties for the
($5,$5), deduct-only condition, for which we expected no “punishment” (i.e., zero
adjustments, as there was no norm violation), we intentionally created an unbalanced
design, assigning only 9 participants to this condition and the remainder roughly
evenly to the remaining conditions (see Table 1). As expected, none of the 9
participants in the ($5,$5), deduct-only condition made any adjustments.
MANOVA F-tests used Pillai-Bartlett’s statistic. All analyses of variance
respected the principle of marginality and used Type-II sums of squares.
Table 1
Sample Size by Adjustment Condition, Offer, and Fairness Context
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Adjustment condition
All-adjustments
Offer: ($5,$5)

Deduct-only

($7,$3)

($8,$2)

($5,$5)

($7,$3)

($8,$2)

Fairness context
Equity

18

17

19

4

20

19

Equality

18

17

21

5

19

19

Total

36

34

40

9

39

38

3. Results
3.1. Overview
Figure 1 shows bivariate mean payoff adjustments by fairness context, offer, and
adjustment condition. As expected, there was a clear main effect of adjustment
condition, as third parties on average made positive adjustments to payoffs in the
punish/compensate condition, and enacted negative sanctions against Proposers in
the deduct-only condition. In addition, the amount that the Proposer offered had a
strong effect in the expected directions on the adjustments third parties made to the
Proposer’s and Responder’s payoffs. There appeared to be no effect of fairness
context, as evidenced by the visual similarity of the left and right panels of Figure 1.
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Figure 1. Ellipses show direction of covariation but are omitted for adjustments of
$0.00.

3.2. Adjustment behavior
A 3 x 2 x 2 MANOVA of adjustments made to the Proposer’s and Responder’s
payoffs confirmed the presence of main effects of offer (F(4, 370) = 11.0, p < .0001)
and adjustment condition (F(2, 184) = 46.1, p < .0001)). There were no significant
effects of fairness context (F(2, 184) = 0.4, p = .67), Offer x Fairness Context (F(4,
370) = 1.7, p = .15), Offer x Adjustment Condition (F(4, 370) = 0.67, p = .61),
Fairness Context x Adjustment Condition (F(2, 184) = 0.1, p =.94), or the three-way
interaction (F(4, 370) = 1.0, p = 0.44). Although the MANOVA detected no effect of
fairness context, because we had a specific, directional hypothesis that adjustments
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to the Proposer would be higher and adjustments to the Responder would be lower in
the equity context, we reanalyzed the data using more powerful statistical methods.
However, an exact, multivariate permutation test revealed no significant effects of
fairness context (p = .52), fairness context by offer (p = .25), fairness context by
adjustment condition (p = .82), or fairness context by offer by adjustment condition
(p = . 28).2 Therefore, we collapsed over fairness context in subsequent analyses.
The effect of adjustment condition was driven by more negative adjustments
in the deduct-only condition than in the all-adjustments condition, for both the
Proposer’s payoff (M = +$0.85 for deduct-only and M = -$1.79 for all-adjustments)
and Responder’s payoff M = +$2.96 for deduct-only and M = -$0.14 for alladjustments). The effect of offer amount was driven by higher adjustments for
($5,$5) offers for both the Proposer’s payoff (M = $2.33 for ($5,$5), M = -$0.95 for
($7,$3), and M = $1.26 for ($8,$2)) and the Responder’s payoff (M = $2.87 for
($5,$5), M = $1.08 for ($7,$3), and M = $1.35 for ($8,$2)).
That adjustments to the Proposer’s payoff were higher when the Proposer
offered ($5,$5) was consistent with our prediction that third parties would reward
fair outcomes. However, we did not expect adjustments to the Responder’s payoff to
also be positive for ($5,$5) offers, as Responders did nothing to generate the even
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
   	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
2

The permutation test of Strasser & Weber (1999) implemented in the R coin package and described
by Hothorn, Hornik, van de Wiel, & Zeileis (2006) maps a multivariate linear statistic, T, into a
univariate test statistic by standardizing T and taking the maximum of absolute values over T. For the
present application, T is the sum of bivariate adjustments in the equality and equity conditions, where
the adjustments to the Responder’s payoff is pre-multiplied by -1. Standardizing this vector and
taking the higher of the absolute value of adjustments to the Proposer’s and Responder’s payoff yields
the univariate statistic. Permuting the fairness context labels then yields the null distribution from
which the proportion of test statistics greater than the observed statistic determines the p-value. This
method is exact up to arbitrary Monte Carlo precision.
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outcome. This unexpected finding may be due to third parties not wanting to create
inequality by rewarding only Proposers. Indeed, creating an inequality in this case
would defeat the purpose of positively sanctioning norm-abiding behavior, as in this
case the desired outcome is equality.
As expected, there was no evidence of spite (negative adjustments to the
Proposer for even offers, or any negative adjustments to the Responder).
3.3. Inequality Aversion and Half as a Focal Point
Did third parties attempt to equalize the payoffs of Proposers and Responders?
Figure 2 shows mean payoffs before and after third party adjustments. An ANOVA
of the difference between the Proposer’s and Responder’s adjusted payoffs revealed
significant effects of offer amount (F(2, 185) = 28.7, p < .0001) and adjustment
condition (F(1, 185) = 5.5, p = .02), and no other main effects or interactions. The
Proposer’s adjusted payoff was $3.40 higher than the Responder’s for offers of
($8,$2), p < .0001, $1.97 higher for offers of ($7,$3) , p < .0001, but not
significantly different for offers of ($5,$5), p = .14. In the all-adjustments condition,
the Proposer’s adjusted payoff was $1.28 higher than the Responder’s (p < .0001),
and $2.81 higher in the deduct-only condition (p < .0001). These remaining payoff
inequalities should be judged relative to the original inequalities, which were $0.00
for offers of ($5,$5), $4.00 for ($7,$3), and $6.00 for ($8,$2). On average, third
parties reduced the amount of inequality between the Proposer’s and Responder’s
payoffs, but did not equalize them, as indicated by the sizable and statistically
significant remaining differences.
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Modal adjusted payoffs were ($5,$5) for both ($5,$5) offers and ($7,$3)
offers; for ($8,$2) offers, ($5,$5) was the second most frequent outcome. In the alladjustment condition, third parties appeared to be motivated to bring the
Responder’s payoff up to $5, the ‘rightful’ share dictated by a norm of fairness. In
the deduct-only condition, third parties adjusted the Proposer’s payoffs of $8 or $7 to
$5, but no lower. Thus, $5 was a focal point for most third parties, and their primary
motivation was to ensure payoffs were close to this focal point, although the
difference between the modal and mean adjusted payoffs implied significant
heterogeneity. Thus, third parties sought to pursue a variety of sanctioning motives
subject to the constraint that they create no additional inequality, and were not averse
to allowing inequalities in payoffs to remain.
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Figure 2. Payoff adjustments by adjustment condition. Black arrows join payoffs
before and after third party adjustments. Payoff labels were rounded to the nearest
whole number to facilitate visualization. Gray arrows represent the directions of the
greatest increases in payoff equality. The 45 degree line corresponds to complete
equality.
3.4. Willingness to Spend on Third-Party Sanctioning and Compensation
In addition to considering the pattern of adjusted payoffs, it is also worthwhile to ask
whether the cost that third parties incurred to adjust Proposer’s and Responder’s
payoffs differed by condition. Because third parties had to spend $0.25 for each
$1.00 they added to or deducted from the Proposer’s or Responder’s payoffs, total
expenditures could reach $5.00. An ANOVA of the amounts spent by third parties
revealed significant effects of offer amount (F(2,185) = 3.7, p = .0268), adjustment
condition (F(1,185) = 21.0, p < .0001), and their two-way interaction (F(2,185) =
8.7, p = .0063). No other main effects or interactions reached significance.
For the deduct-only condition, expenditures were $0.00 for offers of ($5,$5),
$0.43 for offers of ($7,$3), and $0.65 for offers of ($8,$2). For the all-adjustments
condition, third parties spent $1.66 for offers of ($5,$5), $0.88 for ($7,$3), and $1.08
for ($8,$2). Of particular note is that the respective expenditures by offer amount in
the all-adjustments were all significantly higher than in the deduct-only condition.

3.5. Heterogeneity in Third Party Adjustment Behavior
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The fact that, on average, third parties adjusted payoffs only partially to equality
could belie significant heterogeneity in motives and behavior. The average
movement of adjustments in the all-adjustment condition was ($7,$5) and ($8,$5) for
offers of ($7,$3) and ($8,$2), and ($8,$9) for ($5,$5) offers. Yet ($5,$5) was the
modal outcome for both ($5,$5) offers and ($7,$3) offers, and it was the second most
frequent outcome for ($8,$2) offers. This shows that the adjusted payoff of ($5,$5)
was a focal point for most, but not all, players.
To explore potential heterogeneity in adjustment behavior, we categorized
each outcome into one of the nine combinations formed by whether the Proposer’s
and the Responder’s payoffs respectively were increased, decreased, or left
unchanged; Table 2 tabulates these categories by offer amount and adjustment
condition. There was a substantial number of failures to make any payoff adjustment
(see (n,n) category), comprising 12-30% of the data in the all-adjustments condition,
and 34-100% of the data in the deduct-only condition. Because adjustments had a
monetary cost to participants, it is likely that such behavior reflects greater weighting
of selfish motives compared to the desire to punish, reward, or compensate.
Moreover, for some participants this selfish concern appears to be stronger when
outcomes are very unequal, as it costs more to restore equality. Despite the
observation that, on average, third parties spent more when faced with ($8,$2), in the
all-adjustment condition, 30% chose to do nothing (n,n), as opposed to only 12% of
third parties who were presented with the ($7,$3) outcome. And whereas 35% of
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third partied presented with ($7,$3) compensated the Responder (n,+), only 15% of
those presented with ($8,$2) did so.
Although the majority of the remaining adjustments reduced the amount of
inequality, there was clearly a separate motive to increase total payoffs. 61% of
participants increased both the Proposer’s and Responder’s payoffs for ($5,$5)
offers, 18% did so for ($7,$3) offers, and 25% did so for ($8,$2) offers. On the
whole, it appears that third parties sought to pursue a variety of sanctioning motives
subject to the constraint that they create no additional inequality.
Table 2
Counts of Adjusted Payoff by Adjusted Payoff Category, Adjustment Condition, and
Offer
Adjusted Payoff Category1
Offer

(+,+)

(n,+)

(-,+)

(+,n)

(+,-)

(n,n)

(-,n)

(n,-)

(-,-)

($5,$5)

22

4

2

1

0

7

0

0

0

($7,$3)

6

12

12

0

0

4

0

0

0

($8,$2)

10

6

12

0

0

12

0

0

0

($5,$5)

9

0

0

0

($7,$3)

18

19

1

1

($8,$2)

13

24

0

1

AllAdj.

DeductOnly
1

“+” represents a positive adjustment to the offer, “-” a negative adjustment, and “n”

no adjustment. In each pair, the first position represents an adjustment to the payoff
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of the Proposer, and the second position represents an adjustment to the payoff of the
Responder. For example, for an offer of ($7,$3), an adjusted payoff of ($5,$5) would
be classified as “(-,+)” and an adjusted payoff of ($7,$7) would be classified as
“(n,+)”.

3.6. Third-Party Normative Fairness beliefs
Table 3 shows average third party first and second-order normative beliefs about fair
offers by fairness context and offer. 47 participants were excluded due to missing
data. Normative beliefs were unimodal, with almost all participants indicating that
($5,$5) was fair and that they believed the majority of other third parties believed it
was fair. At the extremes, only 5% of participants considered ($10,$0) to be fair,
whereas 15% considered ($0,$10) to be fair.
There were significant differences in beliefs by fairness context. Consistent
with our hypotheses, participants in the equity context were more likely than
participants in the equality context to view splits favoring the Proposer as being “fair
for both the Proposer and the Responder,” averaging across offers. On the other
hand, participants in the equality context were more likely to view splits favoring the
Responder as being “fair for both the Proposer and the Responder.” Second-order
normative beliefs (whether the participant believed the majority of other participants
believed each option was fair) exhibited a similar pattern, characterized by
participants in the equity context being more likely to believe that others though
splits favoring the Proposer were fair. Similarly, in the equality condition, splits
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favoring the Responders were believed to be judged as fair by the majority of
participants. It is interesting to note that, though the “entitlements” of Stage 1 were
simply due to earning high scores on a general knowledge quiz, and thus had little
substantial justification, they strongly influenced third parties’ first and second-order
beliefs about fair divisions.
Because Table 3 reveals only average fairness beliefs, it potentially masks a
variety of important individual-level patterns. Consider, for example, that 5% of
participants believed ($10,$0) was “fair for both the Proposer and the Responder”
(hereafter “fair for both players”) and that 15% believed ($0,$10) was fair for both
players. It would seem highly unlikely that these two groups overlapped at all. More
generally, we expected that participants who held Proposer-favoring normative
beliefs (i.e., ($10,$0), ($9,$1), ($8,$2), etc. are fair for both players) would be largely
distinct from participants who held Responder-favoring beliefs (i.e., ($0,$10),
($1,$9), ($2,$8), etc. are fair for both players). In addition, we expected such
individual-level patterns to vary by fairness context, with participants in the equity
context being more likely to adopt Proposer-favoring normative beliefs, and
participants in the equality context being more like to adopt Responder-favoring
beliefs.
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Table 3
Summary of Fairness Beliefs by Fairness Context
Fairness Context
Offer
Equity
Equality
Is the offer fair for the both Proposer and the Responder?
($10,$0)
5%
4%
($9,$1)
11%
4%
($8,$2)
23%
5%
($7,$3)
37%
18%
($6,$4)
72%
52%
($5,$5)
93%
100%
($4,$6)
41%
61%
($3,$7)
17%
27%
($2,$8)
9%
23%
($1,$9)
9%
22%
($0,$10)
8%
21%
Do the majority of other participants believe the offer is fair?
($10,$0)
1%
0%
($9,$1)
7%
0%
($8,$2)
17%
3%
($7,$3)
49%
18%
($6,$4)
80%
65%
($5,$5)
95%
100%
($4,$6)
48%
61%
($3,$7)
21%
23%
($2,$8)
7%
12%
($1,$9)
4%
9%
($0,$10)
4%
8%
N
74
75

All
5%
7%
14%
28%
62%
97%
51%
22%
16%
16%
15%
1%
3%
10%
34%
73%
97%
55%
22%
9%
7%
6%
149

To investigate participant-level heterogeneity in beliefs, we subjected the 11 firstorder fairness beliefs to a latent class analysis. A four-class solution shown in Table
4 was chosen based on successive goodness of fit tests and interpretability. Class 1
had an estimated population share of 42%, and was characterized by participants
who believed that roughly even splits – namely ($6,$4), ($5,$5), and ($4,$6) – were
fair. Class 2 accounted for an estimated 34% of the population, and was
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characterized by the belief that only ($5,$5) was fair. Class 3 had an estimated
population share of 16%, and was characterized primarily by the belief that
Responder-favoring splits –namely ($0,$10), ($1,$9), ($2,$8), ($3,$7), ($4,$6) –
were fair. Finally, Class 4 accounted for 9% of population and was characterized by
the belief that Proposer-favoring splits – namely ($9,$1), ($8,$2), ($7,$3), ($6,$4) –
were fair.
Table 4
Estimated Latent Class Parameters by Fairness Beliefs (N = 149)
Latent Class1
Offer

1

2

3

4

($10,$0)

0.2

0.2

($9,$1)

0.3

0.4

($8,$2)

0.3

1.0

($7,$3)

0.4

1.0

($6,$4)

0.9

0.2

0.7

0.8

($5,$5)

1.0

1.0

1.0

0.8

($4,$6)

0.8

1.0

0.2

($3,$7)

0.1

1.0

0.1

($2,$8)

1.0

($1,$9)

1.0

($0,$10)

0.9
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Est. Population Share

41.4%

33.7%

16.1%

8.7%

Note: Estimates less than 0.1 are not shown.
1

Class descriptions: 1) Roughly even-split; 2) Even-split; 3) Responder-favoring; 4)

Proposer-favoring.
Table 5 tabulates predicted class membership – that is, the latent class to which each
of the 149 participants was most likely to be assigned based on posterior modes – by
fairness context. As expected, class membership varied by fairness context (p =
.0002, Fisher’s exact test for independence), with the effect being driven by the
complete absence of Class 4 (those who believed Proposer-favoring splits were fair)
in the equality condition, and a smaller proportion of Class 3 (those who believed
Responder-favoring splits were fair) in the equity condition. Fairness context thus
had a strong association with whether participants adopted fairness beliefs that
favored the Proposer or the Responder. Although we do not report them here, nearly
identical analyses and conclusions for the latent class analysis and the association
between predicted class membership and equity context obtained for second-order
beliefs.
Finally, a 4 x 2 MANOVA of adjustments made to the Proposer’s and
Responder’s payoffs revealed no effects of predicted class membership (F(6, 284) =
0.97, p = .45), fairness context (F(2, 141) = 0.18, p = .84)), or their two-way
interaction (F(4, 284) = 0.09, p = .99)).
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Table 5
Cross-Tabulation of Predicted Class Membership by Fairness Context
Latent Class
Fairness Context

1

2

3

4

Total

Equity 25

29

7

13

74

Equality 31

27

17

0

75

Total 56

56

24

13

149

4. Discussion
Third party norm-regulating behavior appeared to be driven by at least two distinct
motives: 1) to reward equal outcomes without creating inequality and 2) to adjust
parties’ unequal payoffs to a normative value. When adding to the payoffs of the
Proposer or the Responder was an option, third parties increased the payoffs of both
parties in equal amounts when the Proposer offered ($5,$5). For uneven offers of
($7,$3) or ($8,$2), however, third parties reduced inequality either by compensating
the Responder when compensation was an available option or – when the only
option for adjustment was to deduct – by punishing the Proposer. Of note is that
adjustments in both conditions give one of the players the “rightful” payoff of $5, in
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line with a fairness norm. Finally, this pattern of behavior is not compatible with a
theory of inequality aversion, as third parties allowed payoff inequalities to remain
and also exhibited rewarding behavior.
First and second-order normative beliefs show that a majority of third parties
endorsed (and agreed upon) fairness norms and were sensitive to contextual
differences. Fairness as equality (the $5,$5 outcome) was endorsed by the largest
majorities of participants in both conditions. In the equity condition, a majority of
72% also believed that ($6,$4) was fair, as opposed to a small majority of 52% in the
equality condition. This pattern was reversed for the ($4,$6) outcome; in the equality
condition, 61% considered this outcome to be fair, whereas only 41% of third parties
thought so in the equity condition. The second-order normative beliefs show the
same pattern, suggesting that there is an implicit agreement as to what fairness
dictates in each condition.
Note that third parties in the equity condition were judging the fairness of
different possible offers under the Stage 1 description provided by the
experimenters. It was thus clear to them that the “entitlement” was related to scoring
higher on an arbitrary quiz. Though one may doubt that performance on an arbitrary
quiz would justify entitlement, third parties believed otherwise. For example, 49% of
third parties held the belief that a majority of other parties would find a ($7,$3)
division to be fair in the equity condition, whereas only 18% of third parties held
such belief in the equality condition.
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However, the manner in which roles were assigned to Proposers and
Responders did not affect adjustment behavior. Because our analyses showed strong
effects of fairness context on first and second-order fairness beliefs, we consider our
manipulation of the relevant fairness norm -- equality, in the case of random role
assignment, and equity, in the case of performance-based role assignment -- to have
been successful. Against the background of previous findings that equity contexts
lowered offers (Hoffman et al., 1994), one interpretation of our findings is that the
equality norm overshadowed the effects of fairness context. Thus, though third
parties recognize the difference between equity and equality, their behavior is much
less fine-tuned, showing that an egalitarian principle is far more important than
equity in deciding how to adjust players’ payoffs.
Another possibility is that normative consensus is not a good predictor of
behavior, and that actual behavior better measures the intensity with which
normative principles are adhered to. Whereas our questionnaire measures the level of
normative consensus, actual behavior measures the intensity with which these
principles are adhered to (Rauhut & Winter, 2010). Thus a norm may be present but,
as Ostrom (2000) observed, “social norms may lead individuals to behave differently
in the same objective situation depending on how strongly they value conformance
with (or deviance from) a norm” (p. 144). In our experiment, the public declaration
of adjustment should have made second-order normative expectations of fairness as
equality particularly salient (and safe to publicly endorse). If third parties want to
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conform to the expected majority opinion, they would discount context differences
in favor of the focal ($5,$5) allocation.
In addition, third parties were more willing to incur personal costs to modify
the payoffs of others when they had the opportunity to sanction or compensate, as
opposed to having only the option to negatively sanction. This finding is relevant to
theories of justice and tort law in which the compensation of a victim may be traded
off against the punishment of a perpetrator, and suggests that on the whole, third
parties are averse to punishing and prefer instead to compensate.
Although third party punishment has been extensively studied in laboratory
settings, our paper contributes to the literature by comparing a broader set of
regulatory mechanisms that can serve to uphold a norm, namely negative sanctions,
positive sanctions, and compensation behavior by third parties. Future work could
compare brain activation patterns implicated in negative sanctioning (e.g.,
Buckholtz, et al., 2008; de Quervain, et al., 2004) to those in positive sanctioning or
compensation to test whether different mechanisms of regulating social norms
activate the same neural pathways. As interest grows in studying the regulation of
norms other than fairness – such as trust, reciprocity, and corruption – it will be
increasingly important to consider both positive sanctioning and compensation
behavior in addition to negative sanctioning to better understand how norms operate
in the real world.
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